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Faculty Observables and Self-Reported Responsiveness to
Academic Dishonesty
Robert T. Burrus, Jr., Ph.D.
Adam T. Jones, Ph.D.
William H. Sackley, Ph.D.
Michael Walker, Ph.D.
University of North Carolina, Wilmington
ABSTRACT
Prior to 2009, a mid-sized public institution in the southeast had a faculty-driven honor policy
characterized by little education about the policy and no tracking of repeat offenders. An
updated code, implemented in August of 2009, required that students sign an honor pledge,
created a formal student honor board, and developed a process to track and hold accountable,
repeat offenders. Self-reported data on faculty vigilance to detect and punish cheating is
collected both prior to and after a change in the honor code at a mid-sized public institution in
the southeast. We find that, at the time of the first survey, full professors and faculty with a
longer duration of employment were more likely to claim vigilance in cheating detection and
harshness in punishing cheaters than newer, untenured faculty. The relationship between these
factors and detection and harshness diminished when the honor code was enhanced.
Keywords: academic honesty, faculty, administration, honor code

T

he cheating epidemic in universities across the world is well documented, with recent research
taking the problem as given and examining factors that contribute to cheating or whether the
problem is getting worse. In the effort to develop policies to prevent student cheating, many
studies have focused on factors correlated with academic dishonesty. These factors broadly include
individual student characteristics (age, gender, grade-point average, and membership in a fraternity or
sorority), perceptions about the cheating of peers, whether professors are clear in defining cheating,
and perceptions about the likelihood of being caught for cheating and the severity of penalties if caught.
The research presented in this article contributes to the literature by focusing on changes in faculty
vigilance and attitudes, rather than focusing on students, following the imposition of an honor code.
While there is a growing consensus that cheating is a problem on academic campuses, the more difficult
as well as more interesting topics may be causes and prevention methods. In general, students and
faculty have substantially similar views of what is considered cheating. Roig and Ballew (1994) find that
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student perceptions of what faculty consider cheating match faculty views relatively closely, while
faculty tend to overestimate students’ tolerance of academic dishonesty. However, it should be noted
that students’ perceptions of professors’ tolerance correlates with their own tolerance. This could be
students projecting their views onto faculty, or students may be taking cues from faculty members. To
the extent that it is the latter, further research on faculty attitudes is warranted. The research presented
below examines the relationship between self-reported faculty vigilance in detecting and punishing
cheating and observable faculty characteristics.
Cheating Definitions and Demographics
Graham et al. (1994) compared survey data of students from a private Catholic college and a community
college to that of faculty at the Catholic college and found agreement between students and faculty
about the most egregious infractions. However, a much smaller percentage of students believed
behaviors that were helping others, such as providing information about a test or allowing someone to
copy homework, constituted cheating. There was also disagreement about using an old test to study
without the teacher's knowledge or submitting a paper for more than one class. Exploring the more
ambiguous behaviors, Higbee and Thomas (2002) surveyed students and faculty and found that student
and faculty views are similar but there is considerable disagreement within each group. Burrus,
McGoldrick, and Schuhmann (2007) showed that providing a definition of cheating increases the
number of incidents self-reported by students. Their result implies that the set of behaviors considered
cheating is not universal.i Even if the dichotomous definitions of cheating were the same, Roth and
McCabe (1995) showed that agreement on the severity of infractions, as judged by penalties suggested,
is lacking.
In addition to the focus on definitions of cheating, there is a healthy literature on student- specific
characteristics and situational factors that contribute to cheating. One such factor is students’
perception or experience with others cheating.ii O’Rourke et al. (2010) suggested that when viewed as a
social behavior, the knowledge, suspicion, or direct observation of peers cheating may have an
important effect on students’ behavior. In fact, they found that when presented with a vignette
including peer cheating, students’ responses regarding their own anticipated behavior is only moderated
by latent attitudes. This finding emphasizes the importance of a culture of honesty and creating a
negative-feedback loop instead of defaulting to the positive-feedback loop prevalent on academic
campuses. By default, responsibility for clearly communicating a definition of acceptable and
unacceptable behavior falls to the individual faculty member. Parameswaran (2007) went as far as to
state that faculty members have a responsibility to prevent cheating and faculty who “allow” dishonesty
are morally responsible for it.
Prevention
Having established that academic dishonesty is a problem, the literature also investigates techniques for
prevention. Much of the literature views academic dishonesty as analogous to crime and is based on
Becker’s (1968) seminal work modeling the supply of crime as a function of probability of conviction and
the likely punishment once convicted, sometimes also referred to as certainty and severity of
punishment respectively. Doob and Webster (2003) provided a review of the crime literature and found
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that the response to severity of punishment is almost non-existent; yet most researchers are hesitant to
accept the finding. Doob and Webster’s findings are consistent with other reviews such as Paternoster’s
(1987). This suggestion is supported by Barnard-Brak, Schmidt, and Wei (2013) who used experimental
style survey data varying the penalty for infraction and found that being reported to an honor board
may not have any deterrent effect beyond that of a verbal reprimand and grade penalty. While there is
some work suggesting severity (or its perception) of penalties deters cheating, such as Burrus et al.
(2013), LaSalle (2009), Mixon (1996), etc., there are also studies that found severity of penalties to be
positively related to cheating and suggest there are potential endogeneity problems in such variables
(McCabe & Trevino, 1993). In addition, many studies found the probability of punishment is much more
important than severity, such as McCabe and Trevino (1993) or Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) to cite only
two.
While the literature on strategies to prevent cheating is fairly significant, the literature regarding tactics
remains relatively thin. One notable exception is Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (2009) who found both
cheaters and non-cheaters believe question scrambling to be an effective cheating-reduction tactic. In
addition, cheaters believe the use of study sheets and passing out old exams to be a more effective
deterrent than non-cheaters believe. This result is consistent with the literature that suggests the
perception that others are cheating or have some advantage contributes to the likelihood of cheating;
by leveling the playing field and being clear about the expectations, faculty make cheating less tempting.
The most effective countermeasure may be to build up and tap into student morals and integrity. Ogilvie
and Stewart (2010) and Cochran et al. (1999) suggested that student attitudes – especially shame – are
the most important deterrents. Their findings, combined with the ineffectiveness of administrative
punishments, suggest that the role of faculty and administrators may be to promote a culture of
integrity, dialogue with the students, and encourage students to take an active role in policing their
peers.
If, as is often suggested by the cheating and crime literature, it is certainty of punishment that deters
cheating and crime, then the policy prescription is to increase vigilance and follow up on allegations of
cheating. Thus, one component of increasing the certainty of punishment is to encourage and facilitate
peer reporting. Unfortunately, many students are hesitant to report their peers. Nuss (1984) suggested
that only 3% of students would report their peers for any infraction and slightly more than a quarter of
students would report peers for serious infractions unless required to report by the university. In the
case of required reporting, those who would report “any infraction” increases to 15%, and 28% would
report if they believed the infraction to be “serious.” Sierles, Kushner, and Krause (1988) reported that
only 13% of cheaters will anonymously self-report cheating on unproctored behavioral-science exams,
and their findings are considerably higher than Burton and Near (1995), who put the percentage in the
three to four percent range!
Rennie and Crosby (2002) put the percentage of students willing to report peers at 13%; but they also
suggested some reasons why peers would or would not report. Reasons not to report their peers
included camaraderie, fear of retaliation, cheating as the accepted norm, and perception that policing
cheating is someone else’s responsibility. Students also indicated that a lack of guidelines, high
evidentiary requirements, uncertainty about what is considered cheating, and a poor administrative
record on follow-through discourage reporting. Reasons for reporting include avoiding negative
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consequences for themselves or others, maintaining standards and integrity, getting violators the help
they need, and satisfying the desire for vengeance. Jenkel and Haen (2012) suggested that one way to
encourage reporting is to make sure students understand how cheating by their peers affects their own
grade. They also suggested a reporting system must maintain anonymity in order to reduce social costs
and fear of reprisal.
Honor Codes
The varied findings across the research regarding certainty and severity of punishment, peer reporting,
student attitudes, etc., suggest that reducing cheating is more about cultural change than simply a
tweak to administrative policies. McCabe and Trevino (1993) suggested universities that employ
“traditional” honor codes typically have decreased self-reports of cheating. These traditional codes are
characterized by unproctored exams, an honor pledge, the encouragement or requirement of student
reporting of cheating, and student-run honor boards. These campuses generally have higher levels of
peer reporting of cheating (McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001). Yet Vandehey, Diekhoff, and LaBeff
(2007) reported no change in students’ self-reporting of cheating following the imposition of an honor
code, and they found non-cheaters are much more supportive of the honor code than cheaters. Thus, a
change in policy alone may not have an effect. Furthermore, relying solely on students to police cheating
may conflict with other university goals. Gallant (2007) pointed out that relationships, community, and
group learning may conflict with integrity and peer reporting. In promoting a culture of honesty, there is
a role for students, faculty, and administrators, as suggested in Whitley and Keith-Spiegel (2001), in
emphasizing its importance as well as maintaining that focus over time in order to change and/or
maintain the culture.
Most universities (especially large ones) do not use traditional honor codes. This leaves the faculty (and
administrators) on the front-lines against academic dishonesty at universities without traditional honor
codes. Unfortunately, as Staats et al. (2009) suggested, even faculty avoid cheating confrontations, often
due to lack of evidence. Coren (2011) noted that faculty avoidance could be rationalized behavior to
avoid uncomfortable, confrontational situations, and Roig and Ballew (1994) suggested that students
become more tolerant of academic dishonesty when faculty members avoid confrontations.
This increase in tolerance brings the role of honor codes and policies full-circle. Traditional honor codes
rely on pledges and peer policing, which may be lax, and honor policies rely on policies set forth by the
university to which much of the cheating may be unobservable. Many universities have adopted
modified honor codes that retain both faculty and student involvement. These efforts may help to create
a culture of honesty among the students, as suggested by McCabe and Trevino (1997), and an
environment in which faculty persons believe that they are united against cheating.
While there is a rich and growing literature examining factors that impact student cheating, the analysis
of professorial attitudes toward cheating and activities to combat cheating is relatively thin. If the
weakness of a traditional honor code is that it relies on students and culture, the weakness of honor
policies is that they rely on faculty members who very well may have other priorities, such as research.
However, many large institutions use a modified honor-code allocating responsibility to both faculty and
students. This suggests the role of the faculty is to motivate students to learn and master material, as
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well as continue to emphasize the importance of academic honesty and integrity. This paper seeks to
determine the factors that relate to increased faculty policing of cheating at a regional, public university
in the Southeast.
DATA
In the Fall of 2008, the mid-sized public institution in the southeast conducted an on-line survey of both
students and faculty. These initial, anonymous surveys were administered to 5,000 students and all
faculty persons during February of 2009. Following a change from an honor policy to a modified honor
code, a similar survey was also conducted in 2011.
The new, modified code, which took effect in August of 2009, is somewhere between the old policy and
a traditional honor code. The modified code gave faculty the ability to sentence students on their first
cheating offence, with an accompanying letter of responsibility placed in the student’s academic file in
the Dean of Student’s Office. If the student cheated thereafter, the case automatically went before an
honor board consisting of four students and two faculty members. The recommended punishment for a
repeat offender is a one-semester suspension. In addition to the student-led honor board, students now
sign an honor pledge when they arrive on campus and continue to be encouraged to report witnessed
infractions. Both students and faculty are supposed to be educated about the honor code each year, and
the honor code statement appears on nearly every syllabus.
Both faculty surveys had, approximately, a one-third response rate. Faculty members were asked to
indicate which behaviors they considered cheating from a list of eighteen (see Table 1). In the two years
after the new code was adopted, there was an increase in the proportion of faculty who believed that
the listed behaviors constituted cheating in fourteen of the eighteen cases. However, asking for help
from a classmate on the assigned homework, paper, or project was the only behavior that drew a
statistically significant increase in the proportion of faculty listing the behavior as cheating. (Notably,
asking a classmate a question about a take-home exam was significant at the 11% level.) A lower
proportion of faculty reported considering the following as cheating behaviors: adding to one’s
bibliography unread sources, poor citations, visiting a professor to influence grades, and using a cheat
sheet. The only statistically significant decrease, however, was in the case of using unread sources in a
bibliography. This behavior was not specifically outlawed in the new code.
Faculty members were also asked about their university demographics and about the certainty and
severity of punishment in their classes. Variable descriptions of these data are provided in Table 2 with
descriptive statistics provided in Table 3. Using the data acquired from Table 1, the variable Considered
Cheating is the average number of behaviors that a faculty person considered to be cheating (from the
list of eighteen). We note some long tails to the distribution as some faculty members believed that only
a single action was cheating, while others believed that almost all the listed actions constituted
cheating. We also note that there was no statistical change in the average between the two surveys
(pre-code average was 9.05, while post-code average was 9.26 behaviors).
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Table 1
Proportion [Prop.] Considering Behaviors to be Cheating

S.D.

PreCode
Prop.

PostCode
Prop.

Prop.
test
Pvalue

.068

.252

.047

.089

.086*

Using a false excuse to get another exam date or to be
allowed to turn an assignment in past the due date

.808

.394

.803

.813

.788

Writing formulas or other information on the back of an
exam as soon as it is received

.084

.278

.070

.098

.303

Glancing at another student's test during the testing
period

.944

.231

.944

.944

.991

Allowing another student to look on a test during the
testing period

.970

.172

.967

.972

.772

Comparing homework answers with a classmate's prior
to class

.111

.313

.099

.121

.450

Asking a classmate a question about a take-home exam

.578

.494

.540

.617

.108

Using a test or quiz from a previous semester to study

.265

.442

.244

.285

.338

Having someone check over a paper before turning it in

.040

.196

.033

.047

.464

Asking about the content of an exam from someone who
has taken it

.728

.449

.695

.748

.224

.827

.379

.812

.841

.430

.728

.445

.770

.687

.054*

.867

.341

.873

.860

.683

Visiting a professor to influence a grade

.218

.413

.239

.196

.280

Using a cheat sheet during an exam

.939

.239

.948

.930

.425

Having information programmed into a calculator during
an exam

.895

.307

.878

.911

.263

Studying with another student for an exam

.002

.048

0

.005

.318

.089

.285

.085

.093

.745

213

214

Prop.
consider
cheating

Asking for help from a classmate on the assigned
homework, paper, or project

Behavior

Giving information about the content of an exam to
someone who has not yet taken it
Adding to one's bibliography citations that have not been
read so it appears more research has been conducted
than actually has
Failing to properly cite another author's work

Using only resources that confirm your point of view
when preparing a paper
N
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

427
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Table 2
Variable Descriptions
Variable
Name

Type

Description

Considered
Cheating
Vigilance

Discrete

Number of items in Table 1 considered cheating

Discrete

Level of vigilance in detecting cheating [potential answers were very vigilant (4),
moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1)]

Strict
Penalties

Discrete

Self-reported strictness of penalties [potential answers were severe (4), moderate
(3), mild (2), and none (1)]

Confront

Discrete

Level of vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters [potential answers were very
vigilant (4), moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1)]

Prevention
Index
Code on
Syllabus

Discrete

Considered Cheating x Vigilance x Strict Penalties x Confront

Binary

Inclusion of a mention of honor code on syllabus

Topics

Discrete

The number of examples or other honor-code topics on syllabus

Discuss

Binary

Discusses honor code on first day of class

Female

Binary

Indicates respondent is female

Long tenure

Binary

At school longer than 6 years

Full
professor

Binary

Indicates respondent is a full professor

Associate
professor
Full time
lecturer
Business

Binary

Indicates respondent is an associate professor

Binary

Indicates respondent is non-tenure track

Binary

Indicates faculty member is in Business school

Nursing

Binary

Indicates faculty member is in Nursing School

Other
school

Binary

Indicates faculty member is in Education or Arts and Sciences
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Table 3
Sample Statistics
Full Sample
Variable

Pre-Code

Post-Code

Means/Prop.

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Mean

Mean

P-Value

Considered
cheating

9.15

2.29

1

16

9.05

9.26

.344

Vigilance

3.07

.69

1

4

3.04

3.09

.488

Strict penalties

2.81

.89

1

4

2.78

2.85

.442

Confront

3.28

.77

1

4

3.24

3.31

.323

Prevention index

63.62

40.06

1.56

185

62.90

64.33

.712

Code on syllabus

.90

.29

0

1

.88

.93

.135

Topics

3.14

1.95

0

8

2.9

3.37

.013**

Discuss

.81

.39

0

1

.78

.84

.167

Female

.48

.50

0

1

.42

.53

.018**

Long tenure

.52

.50

0

1

.51

.54

.469

Full professor

.25

.43

0

1

.26

.24

.634

Associate professor

.28

.45

0

1

.24

.32

.071*

Full-time lecturer

.15

.35

0

1

.13

.16

.281

Business

.13

.34

0

1

.14

.12

.459

213

214

N

427

Note. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Faculty members were also asked to describe the penalties they assigned for academic dishonesty—
potential answers were severe (coded as 4), moderate (3), mild (2), and none (1)— and how vigilant they
are about detecting and confronting cheating—potential answers were very vigilant (coded as 4),
moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1). On average across both surveys,
faculty consider themselves to be moderately vigilant in detecting cheating; the variable vigilant has a
mean of 3.07. In addition, faculty self-report assigning moderately strict penalties and are moderately
likely to confront observed cheaters. Though each of these variables increased after the new code was
implemented, these increases were not statistically significant.
To ascertain a faculty member’s overall efforts to prevent cheating, a prevention index was created by
multiplying the considered cheating, vigilant, strict penalties, and confront variables.iii To construct the
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index, considered cheating was rescaled, such that believing all 18 behaviors constituted cheating is
scaled as a four; the rescaling helps to align the magnitude of this variable with others used to compute
the index. Given variable coding, the prevention index can range from 0 to 256, depending on the how
broad a faculty member’s definition of cheating is, the strictness of his or her penalties, and how vigilant
he or she is about detecting and confronting cheating. Across both surveys, the average prevention
measure was 63.62, with a slight, but not statistically significant, increase in prevention after the
adoption of the new code.
Faculty persons were queried about reminders they offer to students about the honor code in their
courses. While the majority of professors provide an honor code statement on their syllabus, code on
syllabus, and discuss the honor code on the first day of class, discuss, it is interesting to see the
statistical increase in the attention given to specificity of honor code violations and other issues. In
particular, faculty were asked about including each of eight topics on their syllabi: providing a definition
of cheating, providing a definition of plagiarism, the importance of academic honesty, penalties for
cheating, how to do proper citations, a web link to the honor code, indications about whether students
can work together, and other instructions about the honor code. The average number of these topics
included on a syllabus was a little over three (3.14), but that number significantly grew from the first to
the second survey (2.9 topics to 3.37).
Other data acquired from the surveys were institutional demographic characteristics of the faculty
respondents. Approximately half the respondents to both surveys had a long tenure of six or more years
with the institution. In addition, roughly 25% of respondents were full professors, 25%
associate_professors, 15% full-time lecturers, with the remainder of the respondents being assistant
professors. Between the two surveys, slightly less than half of the respondents were female (48%), with
slightly more than half of respondents on the second survey (53%) being female. Thirteen percent of
faculty respondents were in the business school.
MODEL
Because pre- and post-code survey results are available, it is possible to examine the relationships
between observable characteristics and self-reported vigilance against cheating, as well as the change in
those relationships following the implementation of a modified honor code. Because the surveys are
anonymous, traditional panel techniques cannot be used. In addition, because respondents may be
represented in both the pre- and post-code surveys, the use of a post-code binary variable interacted
with other explanatory variables is inappropriate.
To avoid concerns about respondents being included in both pre- and post-code surveys, one could
estimate a model for each survey and then compare the results. We use a similar approach. The two
models can be simultaneously estimated by interacting each variable with a binary variable indicating
whether the observation is from the pre-code survey, pre, or the post-code survey, post, and including
binary variables for pre-code and post-code in place of the traditional constant. This method of
interactions has the effect of estimating two separate regressions at the same time; it is equivalent to
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stacking the observations from each survey. The benefit of this method is that post-estimation
comparison of the pre- and post-code coefficients is straightforward using an F test.iv
The following equation was estimated using ordinary-least squares for the model with prevention_index
as the dependent variable and estimated using a Poisson regression with vigilance in detecting cheaters,
vigilance, strictness of penalties, strict penalties, and vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters,
confront, as the dependent variable.
Prevention_indexi = prei x (β1 + β2code_on_syllabusi + β3topicsi + β4discussi + ΓΧ) + prei x (β13 +
β14code_on_syllabusi + β15topicsi + β16discussi + ΓΧ)+ εi
Demographic variables are represented by Γ and Χ, vectors of betas and demographic variables
respectively. The regression results displayed in Table 4 list the pre- and post-code coefficients together
for ease of discussion and comparison. In the model, topics is a quantitative variable, and the remainder
of the explanatory variables are binary. All four dependent variables are quantitative to varying degrees
and are scaled such that a higher value is consistent with a tougher stance on cheating.
The literature on observable characteristics of faculty who are soft or tough on cheating is relatively
thin; thus, we have few priors about the coefficients of the variables in our analysis. We anticipate
positive coefficients for code on syllabus, topics, and discuss as all of these reveal faculty attitudes
toward cheating; those more concerned about cheating are likely to give it more weight on the syllabus
and on the first (and possibly subsequent) day of class. We also anticipate full professor and long tenure
are positively related to our measures of vigilance as older, more established professors presumably
take more ownership in the institution and are beyond the more intense research pressures of younger
faculty.v However, two-tailed tests are used to assess the significance of each coefficient. We have no
priors for associate professor or female.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. The first column in the table models the prevention index,
constructed as the product of the number of items a faculty member considers to be cheating times
numeric representations of their self-reported vigilance to detect cheating, strictness of penalties, and
likelihood of confronting cheaters. Columns (2) through (4) model individual components of the index.
The coefficients are ordered such that the estimated values for the pre-code and post-code regressions
are adjacent to each other. Of note is a pattern of reduced significance and magnitude of the
coefficients, lending support to the assertion that the implementation and increased emphasis of the
honor code has made the faculty more uniform in their efforts toward preventing cheating.
While the faculty in general have become more engaged and uniform in their efforts to prevent
cheating, some remain obstinate. For example, prior to the implementation of the new honor code,
code_on_syllabus was not a significant signal of a faculty member’s unobservable efforts to prevent
cheating as measured by the prevention index in column (1). However, the inclusion of the honor code
on the syllabus following the revision of the code is a strong signal of faculty members’ prevention
efforts and vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters. The large magnitude of the coefficient is less
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Table 4
Regression Results
(1) Prevention
(2) Detection
(3) Strict
(4) Confront
Index
Vigilance
Penalties
Vigilance
code_on_syllabus_pre
-10.24+++
-0.0871*++
0.00383
-0.0760++
(-1.16)
(-1.67)
(0.02)
(-1.33)
code_on_syllabus_post
21.57***+++
0.136++
0.144
0.133**++
(2.87)
(1.55)
(1.10)
(2.02)
topics_pre
6.671***+
0.0298***
0.0703***++
0.0333***
(4.38)
(3.95)
(4.03)
(4.08)
topics_post
2.872*+
0.0134*
0.0120++
0.0174**2
(1.90)
(1.74)
(0.73)
(2.41)
discuss_pre
16.47**+
0.135***++
0.259**
0.0449
(2.52)
(2.96)
(2.14)
(0.92)
discuss_post
-0.309+
-0.00196++
0.0251
0.00481
(-0.04)
(-0.04)
(0.25)
(0.10)
female_pre
7.739
0.0439
0.101
0.0518
(1.39)
(1.41)
(1.41)
(1.54)
female_post
5.166
0.0131
0.0470
0.0245
(0.95)
(0.41)
(0.66)
(0.77)
long_tenure_pre
16.78***
-0.0193
0.217**
0.0786**
(2.60)
(-0.52)
(2.52)
(1.97)
long_tenure_post
10.71
0.0515
0.0559
0.0567
(1.40)
(1.47)
(0.64)
(1.45)
full_professor_pre
-1.678
0.0954**++
0.0703
0.0467
(-0.20)
(2.07)
(0.68)
(0.98)
full_professor_post
-11.57
-0.0483++
-0.0347
-0.00794
(-1.17)
(-0.86)
(-0.30)
(-0.15)
associate_professor_pre
-23.44***
-0.0218
-0.126
-0.0249
(-3.26)
(-0.52)
(-1.28)
(-0.53)
associate_professor_post
-9.069
-0.00680
-0.116
-0.0456
(-1.18)
(-0.19)
(-1.18)
(-1.04)
full_time_lec_pre
1.747
0.0366
0.0484
-0.00250
(0.18)
(0.76)
(0.45)
(-0.04)
full_time_lec_post
4.816
0.0357
-0.0213
0.0563
(0.53)
(0.77)
(-0.21)
(1.29)
business_pre
-6.009
-0.0408
-0.0429
-0.0856+
(-0.85)
(-0.91)
(-0.37)
(-1.55)
business_post
7.390
0.0545
0.0432
0.0305+
(0.90)
(1.22)
(0.48)
(0.88)
pre_code
34.57***
0.966***
-0.00126+
1.051***
(3.66)
(16.45)
(-0.01)
(15.84)
post_code
30.37***
0.923***
0.403***+
0.969***
(3.27)
(9.68)
(2.58)
(13.17)
N
427
427
427
427
R2
0.761
Pre ≠ post mode P-value
.0312
.0561
.0732
.1758
+
Note. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; difference in pre and post indicated by p < .1,
++
+++
p <. 05, p < .01
Dependent Variable
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reflective of faculty members who put the code on their syllabus and more indicative of the lax attitude
of those who do not. On average, faculty members who include the code, and/or a link to it, on their
syllabus have a higher prevention index, consider more behaviors to be cheating, consider themselves to
be more vigilant in detecting cheating, assess their own penalties as strict, and believe themselves to be
more likely to confront cheaters.vi This difference is evidenced by the significantly larger coefficient
estimates for the post- versus pre-code values in regressions (1), (2), and (4), all significantly different at
the 5% level as evidenced by the two “plus” symbols next to the coefficient estimates.
Other indicators of faculty efforts such as topics are still an indicator but not as strong. The coefficient
on topics remains a statistically significant indicator of faculty efforts in three of the four regressions but
is a weaker signal following the implementation of the code. The pre- and post-code coefficients for
topics are significantly different at the 10% level for (1), the 5% level in (3), and the 15% level for (2) and
(4). The changes in these coefficients illustrate a substantial reduction in the difference between faculty
in the visible front presented to students regarding academic dishonesty. Furthermore, discuss used to
be a significant signal but no longer is; eighty-four percent (84%) of faculty discuss academic honesty at
the start of their courses. While this is not significantly more than before the survey, many of the faculty
on the softer end of the enforcement spectrum now give academic honesty lip service in the classroom,
thus reducing the value of the signal and increasing students’ uncertainty about the likelihood of
successfully cheating.
Females were slightly tougher than males, although not significantly so, but that gap has closed as well.
Long-tenure has also lost its significance as a signal, again showing that gap between faculty members is
closing. While associate professor previously indicated a weaker attitude toward detecting and
penalizing cheating, associate professors are no longer distinguishable from assistant or full professors.
Finally, there was also a culture shift in the business school. While business was not significantly weaker
than other schools in a statistically significant sense, the estimated pre-code coefficients on business
were negative in all four regressions, a finding consistent with the literature, including Meade (1992),
McCabe and Trevino (1995), and Park (2003). However, the estimated post-code coefficients are
positive, although still insignificant compared to other academic units at the university. For the
regression examining vigilance in confronting cheaters, business is significantly more positive than the
pre-code counterpart; the attitude toward preventing cheating within the business school has improved
by more than attitudes in other academic units following the implementation of the modified honor
code.
CONCLUSION
For all the efforts of administrators, reducing academic cheating is dependent on the faculty and
students, and the students take their cues from the faculty. Faculty members are the front line in the
fight against cheating, set the tone in the classroom, and give students their cues as to how tolerant
they should be of fellow students’ dishonesty. The research presented in this paper suggests that factors
identifying softer faculty, such as the lack of an honor-code reference on their syllabus, not discussing
academic honesty at the start of the course, and having the rank of associate professor, can be
diminished in their signaling value by implementing a modified honor code to present a more unified
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faculty to students. There are several potential explanations for why some faculty members may be
weaker on academic honesty than others, including ignorance of the university’s policies, a lack of
confidence in administrative support, and the desire to avoid uncomfortable confrontations with
students among others. While we do not specifically identify the factors at play, our research does
indicate that it is possible to overcome these qualms through stronger honor codes or policies and
administrative support. The faculty is the front line in the fight against cheating, but administrative
support is a necessary component in holding the line.
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i

This raises the question of whether many institution’s policies would meet the Justice Sutherlands
vagueness doctrine suggesting vague laws are void (Connally v. General Construction Co., 1926).
ii

See Burrus, Jones, Sackley and Walker (2013), McCabe and Trevino (1993), and Mixon (1996) among
others.
iii

The Chronbach’s alpha statistic of reliability for the index is 0.641, slightly below the commonly
accepted 0.70 rule of thumb. However, the small number of items in the index, four, deflates the value
such that 0.641 is assumed to indicate a reliable index.
iv

Alternatively the regressions could be estimated separately and a Chow test used to compare
coefficients. However, separate regressions do not allow for simple testing of individual coefficients to
see if the specific coefficients have changed.
v

Our grandfathers were pessimistic about younger generations, so we assume this comes with age!

vi

These comparisons are made looking only at sample means and are not tested for significance of
differences.
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